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(617)-761-0108, Fax: (617)-621-8018.Assessing the Impact of the September 11 Terrorist
Attacks on U.S. Airline Demand
Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks and
its after-e®ects on U.S. airline demand. Using monthly time-series data from 1986-2003,
we ¯nd that September 11th resulted in both a negative transitory shock of over 30%
and an ongoing negative demand shock amounting to roughly 7.4% of pre-September
11th demand. This ongoing demand shock has yet to dissipate (as of November 2003)
and cannot be explained by economic, seasonal, or other factors.
21 Introduction
No industry has su®ered greater economic damage from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 1
than the U.S. airline industry. In addition to directly causing a temporary but complete shut-down 2
of the commercial aviation system, the attacks caused many travelers to reduce or avoid air travel, 3
weary of a newly-perceived risk associated with °ying. Likewise, following September 11, many 4
businesses put temporary freezes on all but the most essential travel for their employees.1 And 5
although the initial \panic" driven fear of °ying immediately following September 11th appears to 6
have largely dissipated, the stringent new security requirements that were implemented as a direct 7
result of the terrorist attacks have made traveling by air more cumbersome and time-consuming 8
than prior to September 11th.2 The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of September 9
11th on U.S. airline demand and to determine whether or not September 11th and its after-e®ects 10
have resulted in a negative shift in the demand for air travel. 11
Since September 11, 2001, numerous airlines (both in the U.S. and abroad) have been experienc- 12
ing a ¯nancial crisis unlike any in modern aviation history. While United Airlines and US Airways 13
have already ¯led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, many other large U.S. carriers have engaged in dra- 14
matic cost-cutting programs. The prospects for (or lack of) a recovery in passenger demand has been 15
the primary issue in the minds of aviation industry leaders and policymakers alike. In this paper, 16
we investigate the form and extent of the downturn in demand for domestic air travel following 17
September 11, 2001. While there is little doubt that September 11th and its after-e®ects resulted in 18
industry turmoil in the days and months directly following the attacks, there is controversy regarding 19
the longer term impact of September 11th on the airline industry. This controversy arises due to the 20
fact that weak economic conditions (particularly in the labor market) pre-dated{and have largely 21
persisted{since September 11, 2001. 22
Although the airline industry has always been highly cyclical, it has traditionally been able to 23
weather through temporary economic downturns. The impact of September 11th on airline demand 24
has been so severe, however, that demand still remains well below pre-attack levels more than two 25
years after the attacks. Our research purpose is to measure the magnitude of this ongoing shift in 26
demand by disentangling it from both the immediate downward spike following the terrorist attacks 27
(resulting from factors such as the temporary shutdown of the aviation system and the initial panic 28
driven fear of °ying) as well as economic cycle e®ects. Measuring the magnitude of the ongoing 29
1For example, a survey conducted by the National Business Travel Association shortly after the attacks found
that 23% of corporations temporarily suspended domestic travel and 34% of corporations temporarily suspended
international travel. Source: NBTA Press Release, September 19, 2001.
2See, for example \Hassle factor hurting airlines," Atlanta Business Chronicle, April 15, 2002 or \Drive instead of
°y? Maybe a good idea," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 12, 2002.
3demand shift is important for three reasons. First, since the terrorist attacks, there have been 1
and continue to be numerous arbitrations between airlines and their labor unions related to the 2
impact of September 11th on airline demand. Since many airline labor contracts expressly prohibit 3
laying o® employees due to weak economic conditions (i.e., recessions), determining both the initial 4
and ongoing impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks has important rami¯cations on labor 5
negotiations within the industry. In particular, many contracts between airlines and their unions 6
have \no furlough" clauses that prohibit layo®s except in the case of extraordinary circumstances 7
beyond the control of the airline, known as force majeure events. Second, in the weeks and months 8
leading up to September 11th, one of the primary concerns of aviation policymakers was airport 9
and air tra±c control congestion and delays.3 Consequently, understanding the ongoing impact 10
of September 11th on airline demand is important for aviation capacity planners. Finally, to the 11
extent that the demand for air travel has spill-over e®ects into other sectors of local economies 12
(Brueckner 2003, Button, Lall, Stough, and Trice 1999), the impact of lower demand for air travel 13
has much broader economic e®ects than those impacting solely the airline industry. 14
While the events of September 11th and its after-e®ects have been the focus of much industry and 15
policy attention (Masse 2001, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2002, Air Transport Association 16
2003), it has thus far received little attention in the economics literature. One exception is Rupp, 17
Holmes, and DeSimone (2003), which studies airline schedule recoveries following airport closures 18
since September 11th.4
19
Our basic methodology is to estimate a reduced form model of demand for domestic air services 20
using monthly time-series data since 1986. After controlling for cyclical, seasonal and other unique 21
events impacting the industry, we model the post-September 11th period using an attenuating 22
shock process that has both a transitory component as well as an ongoing (as of November 2003) 23
component. After controlling for factors such as trend, seasonality and general macroeconomic 24
conditions, we ¯nd that the events of September 11th led to both an initial demand shock of more 25
than 30% as well as an ongoing downward shift in the demand for commercial air service of roughly 26
7.4%. We estimate that this ongoing demand shock accounts for over 90% of the current weakness 27
in domestic airline demand relative to its pre-September 11th peak. 28
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of U.S. 29
airline demand prior to and following September 11th and discusses some reasons why September 30
3For example, the Department of Transportation issued a Notice of Market-based Actions to Relieve Airport
Congestion and Delay, (Docket No. OST-2001-9849) on August 21, 2001. See also Brueckner (2002) and Mayer and
Sinai (2002).
4Rose (1992) studied general air safety concerns following the industry's deregulation in 1978 and Borenstein and
Zimmerman (1988) investigated the impact of fatal air accidents on airline's pro¯ts and tra±c. Likewise, Mitchell
and Maloney (1989) analyzed the impact crashes on a carrier's (and its competitors') pro¯ts and insurance premia.
411th may have resulted in a longer-term structural change. Section 3 presents our model and 1
empirical analysis. A summary of our ¯ndings and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4. 2
2 Analytical Framework 3
The purpose of our investigation is to determine what{if any{structural impact the terrorist attacks 4
of September 11th has had on domestic airline demand. It is well known that the demand for 5
commercial airline service is both seasonal and cyclical. Thus, an integral part of our analysis of 6
the e®ects of September 11th requires that we e®ectively control for seasonal, economic and other 7
unique factors that are known to have impacted the demand for air service. After controlling for 8
these factors, we should be able to assess the degree to which the current industry malaise is related 9
to September 11th and its after-e®ects. 10
Figure 1 depicts monthly U.S. domestic airline industry revenue passenger miles (RPMs) in 11
addition to its 12-month moving average from January 1980 through December 2003. A revenue 12
passenger mile is de¯ned as one paying passenger traveling one mile. Figure 1 demonstrates (a) the 13
seasonal component of airline demand (RPMs tend to peak in the summer and bottom during the 14
winter), (b) the cyclical component of airline demand, and (c) that prior to September 2001, industry 15
demand has been steadily trending upwards. Figure 1 also highlights a number of notable events 16
that have impacted the U.S. airline industry since 1980, such as the air tra±c controller's strike that 17
started in August 1981 and culminated with the ¯ring of over 11,000 controllers.5 Likewise, the 1991 18
Gulf War and ensuing recession resulted in an industry-wide decline in RPMs for roughly eleven 19
months (compared to the same months of the previous year), after which point RPMs resumed their 20
upward trend. 21
Although Figure 1 illustrates that the U.S. airline industry has faced a number of negative 22
demand \shocks" throughout its history, airline demand{as measured by industry RPMs{has proven 23
to be quite resilient and most negative shocks have dissipated (on an industry-wide basis) within a 24
relatively short period of time. However, there are a number of reasons to suggest that September 25
11th and its aftermath may have imposed a more lasting impact on the demand for airline services. 26
First, September 11th likely caused more consumers to be unwilling to °y because of an increased fear 27
of °ying. Another signi¯cant factor impacting demand has been the increased security measures that 28
have made traveling by air post-September 11th more time-consuming and far less convenient than 29
before the terrorist attacks. This e®ect, often referred to as the \hassle factor" has been especially 30
5The 1981 strike was unlike other labor disruptions among air tra±c controllers in that President Reagan issued
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Figure 1: U.S. Domestic RPMs, January 1980{December 2003
noticeable on the demand for short-haul trips. Figure 2, for example, summarizes the percentage 1
decline in the number of domestic origin and destination (O&D) passengers for the year ending 2
June 2003 compared to the year ending June 2001.6 If the current weak demand for air services 3
were solely related to cyclical factors, one would expect that the decline in passengers, by distance, 4
would assume a fairly uniform pattern. Figure 2 demonstrates, however, that the drop in demand 5
for domestic air service has been most pronounced in short-haul (less than 500 mile) markets, where 6
increased elapsed travel times due to tighter security have made travel by alternative means such 7
as driving or taking the train relatively more attractive following September 11th. As trip distance 8
increases and traveling by air becomes the only viable form of transportation for most travelers, the 9
percentage decline in O&D passengers pre and post-September 11th moderates substantially. And 10
while the 26% drop in the less than 250 mile segment is likely also a result of weakened economic 11
conditions (as a high proportion of passengers °ying 250 miles or less tend to be business travelers 12
on one-day trips), it is important to emphasize that such a dramatic decline in short-haul tra±c is 13
6O&D passengers count travelers based on the starting and ending point of their journey, regardless of whether or
not they make a connection. We compare these two time periods because the year ending June 2003 represents the
most recent data available from the Department of Transportation's DB1A quarterly database of O&D passengers.





























































































Source:  U.S. DOT DB1A Database.  Notes:  Domestic pasengers only.
Figure 2: Change in Domestic O&D Passengers Before and After September 11, 2001
unprecedented. For example, we also compared two similar periods prior to and during the 1991 1
Gulf War and ensuing recession and found that the decline in trips of 250 miles or less only decreased 2
by 10.5%. Moreover, the percentage decline across all other °ight distances was largely uniform. 3
In order to model the impact of September 11th on airline demand, we allow for the possibility of 4
both a transitory as well as an ongoing shock component. The ongoing component (i.e., a downward 5
shift in demand) attempts to capture both the post-September 11th \hassle" factor as well as an 6
increased reluctance to °y based on concerns of further terrorist attacks (i.e., an increased fear of 7
°ying). We characterize such changes as \ongoing" since they are likely to persist at least until there 8
have been signi¯cant improvements in the e±ciency and perceived e®ectiveness of the passenger 9
screening and security systems. The transitory component, in contrast, attempts to capture the 10
relatively short term \panic" or uneasiness with air travel that kept many passengers from °ying 11
in the weeks and months directly following September 11th, but have now{for many passengers{ 12
subsided. Separating the persistent and ongoing components of the September 11th shock is the key 13
component of our empirical analysis we develop in the next section. 14
73 The Data & The Model 1
Data for U.S. airline industry demand comes from the Air Transport Association's (ATA) monthly 2
database of passenger tra±c and represents all revenue (i.e. paying) passengers carried by ATA 3
member carriers.7 In light of the dramatic change in the regulatory environment following deregu- 4
lation, our analysis focusses on the post-deregulatory era.8 Moreover, within the post-deregulatory 5
era, we focus our analysis on domestic travel from January 1986 until November 2003, due to data 6
availability for some of our variables. 7
Our primary measure of airline demand is domestic RPMs. Although the number of O&D 8
passengers is another possible measure, we chose RPMs as our proxy for demand since the average 9
trip length of passengers has been steadily increasing over time.9 Our measure of the airline prices 10
is the average monthly passenger yield (revenue per RPM) as reported by the ATA.10
11
Our baseline model is a reduced form estimation of the natural log of quantity (RPMs) and price 12
(Yield): 13
Baseline Model
ln(RPMt) = ¯0 + X0
t¯X + D0
t¯D + "t (1)
ln(Y ieldt) = °0 + X0
t°X + D0
t°D + ºt (2)
Xt represents a vector of exogenous variables, including both demand and supply shifters. Dt is a 14
vector of dummy variables, accounting for seasonality and various events that may have impacted 15
the market for passenger airline service. Finally, "t and ¹t are mean-zero error terms. We use OLS 16
estimation and account for the auto-correlated nature of the errors by using Newey-West standard 17
7Carriers in the dataset include: Air Florida, Air New England, AirCal, Alaska, Aloha, America West, American,
ATA, Best, Brani®, Capitol, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Hawaiian, Hughes Airwest, Jet America, JetBlue, Midwest,
New York Air, Northeastern, Northwest, Ozark, Paci¯c Southwest, Pan Am, Piedmont, Reeve Aleutian, Republic,
Southwest, Texas International, Trans World, United, US Airways, and Western. This data is available from the Air
Transport Association at http://airlines.org.
8The U.S. domestic airline industry was deregulated in 1978, e®ectively eliminating regulatory constraints that
governed route entry and pricing (Morrison and Winston 1986). A small number of airports in the U.S. are still
subject to various regulatory restrictions. For example, Washington National (DCA), and New York's LaGuardia
(LGA) and JFK airports are subject to the High Density Rule which limits the number of take-o®s and landings;
Dallas' Love Field (DAL) is subject to the Wright and Shelby Amendments, prohibiting carriers from °ying between
Love Field and airports in states other than Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Mississippi, and
Alabama; and DCA is subject to the Perimeter Rule, which prohibits most °ights of more than 1,250 miles to and
from this airport.
9While we feel that monthly RPMs provide a very good proxy for airline demand, it is important to note that
RPMs actually represent the national market clearing level of quantity for commercial air service in any given month,
and thus, incorporate elements of both demand and supply. However, to the extent that industry supply (as measured
by available seat miles) responds to changes in industry demand (albeit, with a lag), RPMs should provide a good
proxy for actual demand.
10It should be noted that the ATA's yield data represents the following subset of carriers: Alaska, American,
America West, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways. While this monthly data excludes several
carriers{including the low cost carriers{it has been well established in the literature (Morrison 2001, Transportation
Research Board 1999) that the prices of all carriers have fallen as a result of competition from low cost carriers.
8error estimates. The descriptions of our independent variables, in additional to further details of 1
our modelling approach, are detailed below. 2
Seasonality: Airline demand is known to be highly seasonal, with the summer and holiday seasons 3
being the strongest. Therefore, we include monthly dummy variables to control for such 4
seasonality. In addition, we also control for some calendar irregularities such as Thanksgiving 5
holiday seasons that over°ow into December and longer than average months of February due 6
to leap years. 7
Economic Trend and Cyclicality: Prior to September 2001, the demand for the air travel had 8
been growing rapidly (see Figure 1), fueled by steady economic growth and declining real 9
airfares. The demand for air travel is also known to be highly sensitive to business cycles. 10
To control for trend and cyclicality factors, we introduce two macroeconomic variables that 11
we consider to be major demand-shifters. Firstly, we use the national unemployment rate 12
as our business cycle indicator. Secondly, we use the domestic labor force to control for the 13
long-term growth of the overall economy.11 While we recognize that gross domestic product is 14
the standard variable for measuring economic activity and its °uctuations, GDP statistics are 15
only available on a quarterly basis, which is not su±cient for our analysis.12
16
Figure 3 plots the national unemployment rate from 1986 through 2003. After reaching his- 17
torically low rates in 2000 and 2001, Figure 3 demonstrates that the onset of the economic 18
downturn is readily apparent prior to September 2001. Moreover, despite the fact that GDP 19
resumed growing in late 2001, Figure 3 illustrates that the labor market has remained relatively 20
weak. 21
One natural question that arises is the degree to which September 11th directly or indirectly re- 22
sulted in a weakened economy, and in turn, higher unemployment. Numerous researchers have 23
studied various economic e®ects of September 11th (i.e. Garner 2002, Hobijn 2002, Virgo 2001). 24
Moreover, it has been well documented that at least some mass layo®s following September 25
11th (especially those in the travel and tourism industries) were directly attributable to the ter- 26
rorist attacks rather than prevailing economic conditions.13 Determining aggregate job losses 27
at the national level attributable to September 11th, however, is almost impossible, since there 28
11We also experimented with the level of non-farm employment as our macroeconomic variable, which yielded
similar results. However, employment ¯gures embody not only trend, but also cyclical °uctuations. Consequently, we
elected to use two separate variables to account for them.
12We also experimented with average weakly earnings as a measure of business cycles. But, the results were not
much di®erent from those obtained with the unemployment rate.
13For example, in the 18 weeks following September 11th, employers reported 430 mass layo® (i.e. greater than 40
employees) events related to 9/11 to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Impact of the Events of September 11, 2001,



















































































































Figure 3: U.S. Unemployment Rate
are literally thousands of small ¯rms whose layo®s would not be recorded by the Bureau of 1
Labor Statistics. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, we do not attempt to di®erentiate 2
between the sources of job losses (i.e, general economic conditions versus September 11th). 3
Consequently, to the extent that September 11th was directly or indirectly responsible for 4
higher levels of national unemployment, our estimation results will underestimate September 5
11's impact on airline demand. 6
In the quantity equation, the RPM and labor force variables are both upwardly trended, rais- 7
ing the suspicion of a spurious regression. However, a Johansen test con¯rmed that these two 8
variables are indeed co-integrated with a time trend.14 Consequently, the estimated coe±cient 9
on the labor force variable is superconsistent, while estimates on other variables remain unbi- 10
ased (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). An alternative model such as one using ¯rst di®erences 11
with an error correction term may be able to specify the dynamic relationship between the 12
co-integrated variables more precisely. However, the September 11th attack was a long-lag 13
event, making the ¯rst di®erent estimation problematic. Moreover, pinning down the precise 14
14We used Johansen's test in the EasyReg software package written by Bierens (2003).
10dynamics of September 11th is not our main research focus. Rather, we would like to control 1
for the overall economic activity level while isolating the September 11th e®ect. 2
Airline Fatalities: Fear of °ying is not a new phenomena. Since 1986, there have been thirty 3
fatal airline accidents involving U.S. scheduled commercial carriers{excluding the September 4
11th terrorist attacks{including one known terrorist attack (the Pan-Am Lockerbie bombing in 5
December 1988). It is reasonable to expect some travelers to experience increased apprehension 6
of °ying, especially when there have been accidents involving a large number of fatalities. We 7
include a variable that measures the number of fatalities on U.S. carriers in order to control 8
for the generic demand impact of airline accidents. If fear of °ying from the September 11th 9
terrorist attacks is comparable to that from other fatal accidents, we expect this variable to 10
pick up the generic fear e®ect. However, it is possible that travelers reacted more strongly to 11
the potential for greater \systematic risk" since September 11th than the \idiosyncratic risk" 12
inherent with air travel. 13
Supply-Side Variables: We also include two supply-side variables. The ¯rst is LCCshare, the 14
share of domestic industry RPMs serviced by low-cost carriers in each month. Many re- 15
searchers (i.e. Ito and Lee 2003, Morrison 2001, Bennett and Craun 1993) have documented 16
the impact of low cost carriers on the U.S. airline industry. Indeed, one recent, comprehensive 17
study (Transportation Research Board 1999, page 49) of the U.S. airline industry noted that 18
\Probably the most signi¯cant development in the U.S. airline industry during the past decade 19
[the 1990's] has been the continued expansion of Southwest and the resurgence of low-fare en- 20
try generally." The second supply-side variable is the cost per gallon of jet fuel, as reported 21
by the Department of Transportation. Since fuel accounts for approximately 10-15% of airline 22
operating costs, its exogenous °uctuation is likely to in°uence airline pricing. 23
Some Extraordinary Events: Although the post-deregulatory U.S. airline industry experienced 24
steady growth until 2001, a few events resulted in temporary negative \shocks" and require 25
special attention. Our model accounts for the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War, and the 26
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (i.e. \SARS") epidemic. Controlling for the last two 27
events is especially important because they may have imposed downward pressure on demand 28
during the post-September 2001 period. Failing to control for these events, therefore, would 29
result in over-estimating the impact of September 11. 30
Descriptive statistics for the variables described above are presented in Table 1 below. 31
11Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable De¯nition Mean
Name (Std. Dev)
ln(RPMt) Natural log of domestic RPMs (000s) in month t 17.2580
(0.179)
ln(Y ieldt) Natural log of domestic yield (CPI de°ated) in month t 2.181
(0.145)
ln(labort) Natural log of national labor force in month t (000s) 11.790
(0.066)
unemployt National unemployment rate (percent) in month t 5.671
(1.050)
LCCsharet Low cost carriers' share of domestic RPMs 0.095
(0.048)
fuelt Price per gallon of jet fuel (PPI de°ated) in month t 3.939
(0.166)
fatalitiest Airline fatalities on U.S. carriers in month t 9.808
(38.953)
D(Leap)t Dummy variable taking value 1 if period t is Feb. during leap year, 0.019
and is 0 otherwise (0.136)
D(Thanks11)t Dummy variable taking value 1 if period t is Nov. and the Sunday 0.014
after Thanksgiving is in Dec., and is 0 otherwise (0.118)
D(Thanks12)t Dummy variable taking value 1 if period t is Dec. and the Sunday 0.014
after Thanksgiving is in Dec., and is 0 otherwise (0.118)
D(IraqWar)t Dummy variable taking value 1 from February to April 2003, 0.014
and is 0 otherwise (0.118)
D(GulfWar)t Dummy variable taking value 1 if period t is between August 1990 0.037
and March 1991 and is 0 otherwise. (0.190)
D(SARS)t Dummy variable taking value 1 from March to July 2003, 0.023
and is 0 otherwise (0.151)
N Number of observations 215
123.1 Modelling The Impact of September 11th 1
Having described the baseline model, we now turn our attention to modelling the impact of Septem- 2
ber 11th. As a starting point, we ¯rst take a non-parametric approach by ¯tting twenty-seven dummy 3
variables{one for each month on and after September 2001{onto the baseline model we introduced 4
in the previous section. For this exercise, we also included the seasonality dummy variables but 5
excluded the Iraq War and SARS dummy variables. Figure 4 plots the coe±cient estimates of those 6
twenty-seven monthly dummy variables across time. Each data point represents the gap between 7
the actual log of the RPMs/yield observation and what the baseline model predicts, after controlling 8
for economic °uctuations and other demand and supply factors. Figure 4 demonstrates that after 9
the sharp drop in September 2001, there was an initial recovery phase. By mid 2002 however, the 10
recovery began to taper o®, and through November 2003, the gap for both RPMs and yield continues 11













































































































































































Figure 4: Dummy Variable Estimates
Next, we construct two simple non-linear models that allow us to measure the magnitude of this 13
ongoing stagnation while controlling for the e®ects of concurrent events such as the recent Iraq War 14
and SARS epidemic (which are not isolated in Figure 4). Both models need to accommodate for 15
13two di®erent types of impacts from September 11th: (a) an ongoing downward shift in the demand 1
for air travel resulting from the increased apprehension of °ying and inconveniences such as the 2
hassle factor, and (b) the initial panic driven fear of °ying directly following September 11th. We 3
allow for the possibility of an ongoing downward shift in demand by including an dummy variable, 4
Dpost911, that takes the value 0 for all observations before September 2001 and 1 thereafter. Thus, 5
the estimated coe±cient on Dpost911 will measure the relative magnitude in the downward shift in 6
demand following September 2001. To account for the sharp decline in demand following September 7
11th that was likely transitory in nature, we also include a shock component that attenuates over 8
time. 9
Model 1: De¯ne T911 as the number of months since September 2001 plus one (for example, T911 = 10
2 in October 2001, 3 in November 2001, and so forth). In Model 1, we simply include the 11
inverse of (T911)2 as an additional regressor. The implicit assumption is that the transitory 12
shock will decay at a rate equal to the squared reciprocal of time.15 Although this speci¯cation 13
is somewhat ad hoc, it has the advantage of being simple to estimate. 14




We append this component to both the RPMs and yield equations in the baseline model. The 15
key parameter of interest is the magnitude of the estimate for ¯shift, which represents the 16
portion of the demand decline that has not yet recovered since September 2001. 17
The dramatic decline (37.8%) in RPMs during September 2001 was an unprecedented event in 18
the history of U.S. aviation and was partly a result of the FAA's complete shutdown of com- 19
mercial air space for two and a half days.16 Thus, some of the decline in RPMs in September 20
2001 is likely due to the government imposed supply constraint. Moreover, we would like to 21
check for the possibility that such an extraordinary month becomes an in°uential observation, 22
pulling down the estimate of ¯shift, our measure of the ongoing demand shift. In order to 23
investigate this issue, Model 2 isolates the September 2001 observation from the rest of the 24
data.17
25
Model 2: De¯ne D911 as a dummy variable that takes value 1 for September 2001 and 0 for all 26
other months. Now, T¤
911 is de¯ned as the number of months since October 2001 (rather than 27
15We also ran the same regression using 1=T911 in place of 1=(T911)2 (not shown). The ¯t of the model was
considerably better with 1=(T911)2.
16Although the FAA re-opened commercial airspace at 11 am on September 13th, most carriers did not resume
°ight operations{other than repositioning diverted aircraft{for another day or two.
17We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this modelling approach.
14September 2001) plus one. Similarly, D¤
post911 takes value 1 for all the months starting from 1
October 2001 and 0 otherwise. 2
¯911D911 + ¯shiftD¤





If the extraordinary dip in September 2001 is indeed an in°uential observation, Model 2 will produce 3
a smaller estimate for ¯shift than Model 1. 4
It is important to emphasize that neither of our two models impose the presence of an ongoing 5
shift in demand. If there has been no ongoing shift in demand as a result of September 11th, we 6
would expect the estimated coe±cients for ^ ¯shift to be close to zero. Thus, in both models, the 7
possibility of an ongoing shift in demand can be empirically tested by performing the following 8
hypothesis test: 9
H0(null hypothesis) : ¯shift = 0 Ha(alternative hypothesis) : ¯shift < 0 (5)
Likewise, the presence of a transitory shock can be tested by performing appropriate hypothesis 10
tests on ¯ 1
t. 11
3.2 Estimation Results 12
The ordinary least squares estimates for Models 1 and 2 are presented in Table 2. Since the model 13
is static and the regressors are identical in equations, there is no gain from estimating the two 14
equations together. Table 2 also reports Newey-West robust standard errors in order to account for 15
a non-spherical distribution of the error term.18
16
18We present the Newey-West standard errors in order to account for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlated errors,
which are natural concerns because of the nature of the data and the reduced form analysis. We have also calculated
the standard errors with a stationary bootstrap method and the results were almost identical to the regular OLS
standard errors, except that the standard error of the ¯shift coe±cient became unusually large due to the extreme
non-convexity of the 1=T2 variable.
15Both the labor force and the unemployment rate are powerful and signi¯cant predictors of RPMs 1
(quantity), consistent with our a priori belief. A higher unemployment rate also reduces yields 2
(prices), which is intuitive.19 A larger labor force, however, also tends to reduce yields. This result 3
is somewhat counterintuitive, and we expect that this is probably due to the fact that the labor 4
force tends to be somewhat correlated with the growth of low cost carriers. Since the reduced form 5
estimates re°ect the combined e®ects of the supply and demand, we caution the reader from drawing 6
too many inferences from these estimates. However, if the estimates in both the quantity and price 7
equation are signi¯cant and in the same direction for the same variable, we strongly suspect that it 8
re°ects a demand change. Conversely, if the price and quantity e®ect move in opposite directions, 9
we suspect that it re°ects a supply change. 10
Consistent with the previous literature, LCCshare has a powerful positive impact on RPMs and 11
a large negative e®ect on yield. The estimated coe±cient on fuel is positive in the yield equation, 12
but is not statistically signi¯cant. fatalities showed almost no impact in either the quantity or price 13
equation. We suspect that this may re°ect a temporary substitution away from the carrier involved 14
in the accident towards other carriers while leaving aggregate demand unchanged. This supports 15
our conjecture that the September 11th attacks were unique in the sense that they resulted in a 16
perceived increase in systematic (as opposed to idiosyncratic) risk. 17
The recent Iraq War had a negative and signi¯cant impact on both domestic RPMs and yield, 18
while the 1991 Gulf War did not. This result is likely a re°ection of the fact that our analysis is 19
limited to domestic travel, as the 1991 Gulf War had a strong negative impact on international 20
tra±c. Moreover, as noted by the NBER's business cycle dating committee, the downturn in the 21
U.S. economy coincided almost exactly with the timing of the our Gulf War variable.20 Likewise, in 22
light of the September 11th terrorist attacks, there was a heightened awareness of the possibility of 23
additional terrorist attacks on domestic °ights during the recent Iraq War. Finally, given that the 24
recent Iraq War largely overlapped with the SARS epidemic, it is possible that the model cannot 25
fully distinguish between these two events. Thus, the Iraq War coe±cients likely re°ect the combined 26
e®ect of these two events. 27
Turning our attention to the ongoing impact of September 11th, we see that the estimated 28
coe±cients on ¯shift are powerfully negative (and signi¯cant at the 1% level) in both the RPMs and 29
yield equations, suggesting a large demand contraction. The decline in RPMs is approximately 7.4% 30
while the yield decline was 10.0%. The negative impacts on both the quantity (RPMs) and price 31
19We also estimated the model with a simple linear trend in place of the labor force variable. The results show
higher predicted RPMs for the post 9/11 period than the results with the labor force variable.
20The peak of the business cycle began in July 1990 and reached its trough in March 1991. Source:
http://nber.org/cycles.
16Table 2: Reduced Form Estimates
Ln(RPMs) Ln(Yield)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant -6.603¤ -6.505¤ 14.989y 14.986y
(2.715) (2.740) (3.595) (3.614)
ln(labort) 2.029y 2.021y -1.071y -1.071y
(0.227) (0.229) (0.299) (0.301)
unemployt -0.033y -0.033y -0.02¤ -0.02¤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
LCCsharet 0.157 0.164 -0.969y -0.968y
(0.283) (0.285) (0.356) (0.358)
fuelt 0.012 0.011 0.019 0.020
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028)
fatalitiest 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
D(Thanks11)t -0.035y -0.035y -0.021 -0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
D(Thanks12)t 0.061y 0.061y 0 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
D(Leap)t 0.033 0.034 0.008 0.007
(0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032)
D(GulfWar)t -0.017 -0.017 0.008 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
D(IraqWar)t -0.042y -0.043y -0.030y -0.029y
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
D(SARS)t 0.013 0.013 0 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
¯ 1
t -0.313y -0.134y -0.073y -0.012
(0.020) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015)
¯shift -0.075y -0.074y -0.101y -0.102y
(0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
¯911 -0.371y -0.176y
(0.020) (0.026)
N 215 215 215 215
¹ R2 .9674 .9677 .9235 .9231
Root MSE 0.0323 0.0322 0.0403 0.0404
Note: Monthly dummy variables have been suppressed.
¤Signi¯cant at the 5% level. ySigni¯cant at the 1% level.
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported.
17(yields) indicate that 9/11 resulted in a negative demand shift, rather than a supply contraction. 1
Moreover, the estimated e®ect of the ongoing demand shift remains almost the same even after 2
we isolate the September 2001 observation from the remainder of the data in Model 2. Thus, 3
these results do not appear to be the outcome of one in°uential observation. If we assume the 4
estimated coe±cients re°ect a pure the demand shift{which, as discussed earlier, is consistent with 5
the simultaneous decline in both quantity and price{the implied elasticity of the airline supply is 6
0.74. 7
Given the limited number of observations after September 2001, it remains to be seen if this 8
ongoing shift in demand is a permanent one. It is possible, for example, that we are observing a 9
portion of a protracted non-linear response with long lags that have lasted more than twenty-seven 10
months. Such a protracted recovery, however, would also be unprecedented in the airline industry. 11
For example, we applied our model to the twenty seven months following the invasion of Kuwait and 12
subsequent 1991 Gulf War and found no evidence of a negative demand shift. 13
We also tested to see if the ongoing shift had any attenuating tendency by inserting a linear time 14
trend on post-September 2001 observations and allowing for a jackknife modi¯cation (the results 15
are not reported in Table 2). The estimated time trends were extremely small and statistically 16
insigni¯cant while the other estimates remained mostly unchanged. This result suggests that the 17
ongoing shift has no apparent tendency to narrow its gap within the observed time period. 18
Finally, it is also important to note that we identify this ongoing shift separately from the tran- 19
sitory shock of September 11th and the estimation results also con¯rm that a substantial transitory 20
shock was present. In Model 1, the estimated coe±cient on ¯ 1
t of -0.313 implies that the initial 21
shock of September 11th resulted in a 31% reduction in RPMs (in addition to the 7.5% ongoing 22
shift). Put di®erently, domestic RPMs reached a historical peak in August 2001 of approximately 23
46.0 billion miles and dropped precipitously to 24.7 billion miles in September 2001, then recovering 24
to 31.4 billion miles in October 2001. The transitory shock to yields of 7.3% was signi¯cantly smaller 25
than the corresponding shock to RPMs which makes sense since many airline tickets are purchased 26
well in advance. 27
Under Model 1, the transitory impact of September 11th diminishes to less than a 1% reduction 28
after 5 months (i.e., by February 2002) for RPMs and after 2 months (November 2002) for yields. 29
Thus, the estimated coe±cients on ¯shift apply mostly to the remaining 20 and 23 months of the 30
RPM and yield data respectively. 31
18Table 3: Goodness-of-Fit Comparison
Ln(RPMs) Ln(Yields)
Model 1 Benchmark Model 1 Benchmark
Model Degree of Freedom 190 199 190 199
R2 0.9726 0.8917 0.9331 0.8312
¹ R2 0.9691 0.8835 0.9247 0.8185
RRS 0.1880 0.7422 0.3043 0.7679
TTS 6.8542 6.8542 4.5486 4.5486
RRS: Residual sum of squares.
TTS: Total sum of squares
Benchmark model employs a linear trend and seasonal dummies.
3.2.1 Goodness of Fit 1
The ¯t of both models is extremely good, with an ¹ R2 of .967 for RPMs and .923 for yields. Since 2
¹ R2s are often high in time-series data, we evaluate the ¯t of Model 1 relative to an alternative 3
benchmark model consisting only of a linear time trend and seasonal dummy variables. Table 3 4
compares the goodness-of-¯t of the two models. While the benchmark model accounts for 89% and 5
83% of the variations in the RPMs and yield respectively, the improvements in ¯t from Model 1 6
are substantial. For the RPMs equation, the residual sum of squares are reduced by 74.7% and for 7
the yield equation, the reduction is 60.4%. Thus, we conclude that our model generates substantial 8
improvements over this alternative benchmark of a linear time trend and seasonal dummy variables. 9
Figure 5 plots the predicted RPM values of Model 1 along with their actual values (both series are 10
seasonally adjusted). The model's predictions appear to capture the post-September 11th demand 11













































































































Note:  Data series are seasonally adjusted.
Figure 5: Domestic RPMs versus Model 1 Predictions
3.3 Analysis of Post-September 11th Airline Demand 1
Having estimated the impact of September 11th on U.S. airline demand, we now use our model's 2
estimates to predict what demand would have been had it not been for the terrorist attacks. For 3
our analysis in this section, we use the predicted values from Model 1. 4
Our methodology is as follows. From the predicted values of the regression model, we subtract 5
both the ongoing and transitory estimated e®ects of September 11th, along with the seasonal °uc- 6
tuation (series (b)). This counterfactual demand prediction is plotted in Figure 6, along with the 7
actual (seasonally adjusted) level of RPMs (series (a)). As illustrated in Figure 6, the model pre- 8
dicts a signi¯cantly higher level of demand had September 11th not occurred, notwithstanding the 9
weakness in the labor market. Recall also that the immediate shock of September 11th is largely 10
dissipated after ¯ve months. The di®erence between the counterfactual (b) and actual (a) RPMs 11
after ¯ve months is the ongoing shift predicted by the model of roughly 7.4%. 12
To put this ¯gure into context, domestic RPMs for the 12 month period ending November 2003 13
(439.0 billion) were approximately 7.9% lower than their historical peak that occurred during the 14
12 months ending August 2001 (476.6 billion). Thus, our analysis would suggest that the ongoing, 15
20negative demand shock from September 11th accounts for roughly 94% of the decline in domestic 1












































































































Predicted System RPMs Without
September 11 Effect
Actual System RPMs
Note:  Data series are seasonally adjusted. 
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: System RPMs versus Model 1 Predictions
3.4 Limitations of the Current Analysis 3
While our analysis provides strong evidence of a negative structural change in airline demand fol- 4
lowing September 11th, we should emphasize that our analysis has some limitations. To begin with, 5
at the time of our analysis, only 27 monthly observations since September 2001 are available, which 6
limits the degrees of freedom for our analysis concerning the post-September 11 period. While the 7
U.S. airline industry has typically recovered from other negative shocks considerably faster than 8
27 months, a catastrophic event such as September 11th could obviously require a longer recovery 9
period. If this is the case, we are still observing the recovery. Based on the data, one cannot rule 10
out the possibility that we are still on the recovery trajectory from September 11th, especially when 11
events such as the Iraq War and the SARS epidemic have put additional downward pressure on the 12
demand for air travel. Consequently, it will be useful to repeat the current analysis as additional 13
observations become available. 14
21Moreover, it is possible that the industry adapts to the post-September 11th environment in 1
some unexpected way. For example, new technological innovations in security screening might 2
eliminate some of the waiting time at airports, thus reducing the hassle factor and making air travel 3
more convenient. Likewise, new forms of passenger screening (i.e., facial recognition) may become 4
widespread and improve passengers' sense of security. 5
Finally, we emphasize that our analysis does not attempt to account for any macroeconomic 6
e®ects caused by the terrorist attacks. Because it is probable that September 11th directly or indi- 7
rectly led to lower levels of macroeconomic activity{and in turn{increased unemployment, our results 8
likely understate the impact of September 11th on airline demand. Moreover, our macroeconomic 9
indicator variables, the labor force and unemployment rate, will tend to overstate the impact of 10
the negative economy on airline demand relative to other variables such as GDP. Nevertheless, we 11
believe that our analysis is useful in that it provides an approach to assist policymakers and industry 12
leaders evaluating the impact of major external shocks{such as the terrorist attacks of September 13
11th{on the U.S. airline industry. 14
4 Conclusions 15
The terrorist attacks of September 11th had a dramatic impact on the U.S. airline industry. Although 16
some of the initial panic and fear of °ying directly following September 11th has dissipated, more 17
rigorous security screening and passengers' perceptions of the risk of °ying have altered the demand 18
for and experience of air travel, especially in the United States. 19
While there is little doubt that September 11th and its after-e®ects resulted in industry turmoil 20
in the days and months directly following the attacks, there is controversy regarding the longer 21
term impact of September 11th on the airline industry. This controversy arises due to the fact that 22
weak economic conditions pre-dated{and persisted{past September 11, 2001. Our analysis attempts 23
to disentangle these macroeconomic e®ects on airline demand from the more direct e®ects of the 24
September 11th terrorist attacks. In addition, our analysis separates the e®ects of September 11th 25
into its e®ects temporary and ongoing components. In summary, we ¯nd that September 11th 26
resulted in both a transitory, negative demand shock of more than 30% in addition to an ongoing 27
negative demand shift of approximately 7.4% that cannot be explained by cyclical, seasonal or other 28
factors. Moreover, we estimate that this structural demand shock accounts for over 90% of the 29
current weakness in domestic airline demand relative to its pre-September 11th peak. 30
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